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Abstract
Decentralization has become a popular development program among
middle- and low-income economies worldwide. The rationale behind
decentralization is the local government’s proximity to consumers gives it an
information advantage over the central government on needs and preferences.
However, the central government has economies of scale and has access to
more resources. Using data from Philippine provinces, this paper studies the
relationship between decentralization – as represented by local government
fiscal independence and as measured by locally sourced revenues expressed
as share of total revenue – and poverty incidence. It finds evidence that
fiscal independence is associated with lower poverty, but the relationship
is not linear. There is an optimal level of decentralization, beyond which, its
relationship with poverty becomes positive. Moreover, the decentralizationpoverty relationship is stronger in provinces with good governance, and
weaker in provinces with lower income.
Keywords: decentralization, poverty, fiscal independence, Philippines
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1. Background and Objectives
Decentralization has become a popular development program among
middle- and low-income economies worldwide (Smoke, 2001), with at least
60 countries including it as part of their development policy over the last few
decades (Bahl, 1999a; Dillinger, 1994). The basic economic rationale behind
decentralization is that it enhances the efficiency of delivery of public services
because local governments have a proximity advantage to economic agents
over the national government (Boadway & Shah, 2009; Shah, 1998; Wallis
& Oates, 1988). This proximity advantage makes the local government more
aware of the needs and preferences of its constituents (Boadway & Shah,
2009). Sub-national levels of government can tailor-fit the public services
that they offer to a group of people that is likely to be more homogenous
and with similar preferences than if provision will be done by the national
government (Wallis & Oates, 1988). By assigning more revenue-generating
and spending powers to local governments, they are able to allocate resources
more efficiently to the consumers and improve equity (Kubal, 2006; Boadway
& Shah, 2009). In addition, decentralization can also make the government
more responsive to the needs of its constituents because it increases citizen
participation and accountability (Faguet, 2009; Kubal, 2006).
However, Bahl (1999a) identified several arguments on why this
standard theory of decentralization may not be applicable to developing
countries. The macroeconomic benefits of centralized governance, lack of
suitable tools for local government finance, and the centralist politics common
in many emerging economies could undermine the benefits of decentralization.
In addition, some local governments could be predisposed to elite capture and
lack technical and financial resources to effectively and efficiently respond to
local needs (Faguet, 2009). Decentralization can also further empower the
already powerful officials at the local level (Asante & Ayee, 2007). Moreover,
the central government has economies of scale and usually has access to more
and better resources (Faguet, 2004; Prud’homme, 1995; Smoke, 2001; Keating,
1995).
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The objective of this paper is to study the relationship between
decentralization and poverty using data from Philippine provinces. The
decentralization indicator used was own-sourced revenues of the provincial
government expressed as ratio of total provincial government revenues. This
measures fiscal independence, or the independence of the local government
from the central government in generating income. A secondary objective is
to determine if decentralization-poverty relationship varies across governance
quality and income levels. Bardhan (2002), Azfar, Kahkonen, and Meagher
(2001), and Agrawal and Ribot (1999) identify governance as an important
factor in making decentralization effective. It was also tested if any
decentralization-poverty relationship is linear or quadratic. Some
decentralization models propose that there exists an optimal decentralization
model, implying an inverted-U relationship between decentralization and
development outcomes.
This paper has several contributions to the literature. There are many
empirical works on decentralization, but most of them study its relationship
with economic growth or governance (Akai & Sakata, 2002; Davoodi & Zou,
1998; Fisman & Gatti, 2002; Arikan, 2004). Empirical literature on the
relationship between decentralization and poverty alleviation – which is the
goal of most decentralization programs in developing countries – is
surprisingly rare. In addition, the case of the Philippines is important because
it is one of the largest countries in the Asia-Pacific region that recently
implemented a decentralization program, doing so in 1991. There have been
country-specific empirical decentralization studies, but the effectiveness of
decentralization can vary from country to country (Alexeev & Mamedov,
2017). Although this article does not address the impact of the 1991
decentralization program specifically, an empirical analysis of decentralization
and poverty using Philippine data is novel. Most of the literature on Philippine
decentralization and its effects on development use conceptual arguments and
descriptive data analysis rather than quantitative and econometric methods
(Manasan, 1992; Capuno, 2017; Liberman, Capuno, & Minh, 2005; Bird &
Rodriguez, 1999; Hutchcroft, 2012; Llanto, 2009).
Before proceeding, it must be emphasized that the decentralization
measure used in this study is only one component of decentralization.
Nonetheless, it is a component that is not often studied empirically, and
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decentralization researchers have argued that the local government’s capacity
to raise revenues independent of those transferred from the central government
is important for decentralization to be effective (Manasan, 1997; Shen, Jin, &
Zou, 2012; Capuno, 2017).
This paper is arranged as follows. This background and objectives
section is followed by a literature review of empirical studies and of theories
on why decentralization and development are related, along with a discussion
on defining and measuring decentralization. Next is the methodology,
including sources of data and the estimation method. This is followed by the
results and a discussion of the implications. The paper concludes with a
summary and recommendations for future studies.

2. Literature Review and Framework
2.1 Why is Decentralization Possibly Related to Poverty?
Jutting et al. (2004) developed a conceptual framework explaining the
transmission mechanism on how decentralization can influence poverty alleviation. Jutting et al. (2004) decomposed poverty into three dimensions –
voicelessness, vulnerability, and limited access to services. Their framework
states that decentralization affects poverty alleviation through two channels
– political impact and economic impact. The political channel affects the first
two dimensions of poverty, voicelessness and vulnerability. With
decentralization, citizen participation in the decision-making process will
increase. This gives the poor better access to public services and social
security, thus decreasing vulnerability and insecurity. The economic channel
works through decentralization’s effect on improved efficiency and better
targeting of providing public services. The higher efficiency improves the
poor’s access to education, health, and other basic services. However, Jutting
et al. (2004) emphasized that certain conditions should be met for the
framework to work. Primary of which is good governance quality, including
accountability, enforcement, social institutions, and the political structure
including checks and balances in the government.
Steiner (2005) slightly modified Jutting et al’s framework. Steiner
likewise acknowledged the two channels by which decentralization can affect
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poverty alleviation – political and economic – but also cites three elements of
poverty alleviation. These are promoting opportunities, facilitating
empowerment, and enhancing security. The first refers to giving the poor the
chance to improve their living conditions through such things as employment,
financial services, infrastructure, and public services. Facilitating empowerment
means involving the people in decision-making, while enhancing security
pertains to reducing vulnerability to threats such as economic shocks, natural
disasters, and sickness. According to Steiner’s framework, decentralization
influences the first two poverty alleviation elements. Similar to the Jutting et
al. (2004) model, decentralization, through the political channel, facilitates
empowerment because it gives decision-making power on what and how much
public services to provide. It also promotes accountability because the greater
proximity of the beneficiaries of the public services to the government allow
for better monitoring. The economic channel works through improvements in
efficiency when decision-making is transferred to sub-national governments.
Because of the information advantage of local over national governments,
service provision can be better matched with needs (Von Braun & Grote, 2002).
A decentralization-poverty relationship can also be deduced from some
theoretical models. In the models by Davoodi and Zou (1998) and Xie, Zou,
and Davoodi (1999), the government maximizes the utility of a representative
consumer subject to certain resource constraints. The result is an optimal
level of decentralization that maximizes economic growth and consumer
utility. This implies that at lower levels of decentralization, a positive
relationship between decentralization and growth and utility can be expected.
However, at decentralization levels above the optimum, the relationship
becomes negative. Since economic growth is positively correlated to poverty
alleviation, this suggests the possibility that decentralization and poverty can
have a U-shaped relationship. That is, decentralization can have a negative
relationship with poverty at low decentralization levels, but it becomes positive
at high decentralization levels.
Another mechanism by which decentralization can influence poverty
is through its effect on governance. Decentralization can promote good
governance by improving accountability, enhancing consumer participation
in decision-making, and promoting inter-jurisdictional competition (Faguet,
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2009; Usui, 2007; Kubal, 2006; Von Braun & Grote, 2002; Persson &
Tabellini, 2000; Shah, 2006; Tanzi, 1996). By bringing consumers and
providers of public goods closer to each other, it makes it easier for government
officials to be held accountable (Usui, 2007). Because good governance can
influence poverty alleviation (Chakravarti, 2005; Tebaldi & Mohan, 2010),
it is possible that decentralization is associated with poverty.
2.2 Defining and Measuring Decentralization
Decentralization is the transfer of functions and responsibilities
from the central government to the local governments (Rodden, 2004;
Von Braun & Grote, 2002; Litvack, Ahmad, & Bird, 1998). There are three
types of decentralization according to the literature. Political decentralization
is providing consumers or their representatives with greater decision-making
power. When consumers have greater participation in deciding what and how
much public goods to provide, it is more likely to meet local needs and
preferences (Litvack & Seddon, 2000). The second type, administrative
decentralization, is the transfer of responsibilities and power from the
national government to sub-national governments. There are three forms of
administrative decentralization. Deconcentration is the transfer of power and
responsibilities from the central office of a national government agency to its
local offices, while delegation is the transfer from a national government
agency to independent government units such as school districts, transportation
authorities, and the like. The most extensive form of administrative
decentralization is devolution, which transfers power, functions, and
responsibilities from the national to the sub-national governments (Litvack &
Seddon, 2000). The third type, which is closely related to devolution, is fiscal
decentralization, or the transfer of spending and revenue collection functions
from national to sub-national governments (Von Braun & Grote, 2002; Litvack
et al., 1998).
In most cross-country empirical studies, decentralization is measured
by the ratio of local government to central government expenditures or revenues
(Davoodi & Zou, 1998; Goel, Mazhar, Nelson, & Ram, 2017; Kyriacou &
Roca-Sagales, 2009; Rodriguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2011). These are
straightforward indicators of decentralization because they measure how much
of the spending and revenue-raising responsibilities are assigned to the local
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and to the central government. However, comparing decentralization levels
across countries is easier than comparing decentralization across local
governments. Local governments from the same country are under the same
national or federal regulations, and local governments in some countries have
little power. Nonetheless, the literature has come up with various indicators
that could be used in empirical decentralization studies using countryspecific cases. One such decentralization indicator that is applicable to the
Philippines is fiscal independence, or the ability of local governments to
generate its own revenue rather than relying on the central government for
transfers (Zhang & Zou, 1998; Akai & Sakata, 2002; Faguet & Sanchez, 2008).
This paper measures decentralization using locally sourced provincial
government revenues expressed as the percent share of total revenues of the
provincial government.
There are several reasons for using this as decentralization indicator
in the Philippine context. First, it measures self-reliance of the provincial
government in generating income, or the ability to generate its own revenues
rather than depending on transfers from the central government. When the
local government can generate its own income and own-sourced revenues
account for a large share of its total revenues, they do not need to depend much
on the central government for funds. In two studies conducted more than 20
years apart, Manasan (1992) and Capuno (2017) conclude that some local
governments in the Philippines still depend heavily on central government
transfers for funds, and this affected their public service delivery. Second, Akai
and Sakata (2002) argues that even if local government expenditure accounts
for only a small share of total government spending, the local government is
still independent if its spending needs can be financed from within. Third,
some local governments in the Philippines are heavily dependent on transfers
from the central government, formally known as the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA). Although significant functions are assigned to local
governments, some still rely heavily on the IRA to finance these
responsibilities. Fourth, having greater own-sourced income implies that the
local government can implement more programs on its own, reducing the
dependence of its citizens on national government programs. After the 1991
decentralization, Manasan (1997) and Capuno (2017) show that some local
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governments could not fully perform its decentralized responsibilities because
their additional income falls short of the added expenditures.
2.3 Previous Empirical Studies
The empirical literature contains country-specific studies on the
relationship between decentralization and development outcomes,
particularly economic growth and governance. These studies show mixed
results, suggesting that decentralization can have varying influence on
development across countries and depending on the decentralization
measure. Among the most common decentralization indicators used in
country-specific empirical papers include number of local governments per
person or per area (Stansel, 2005; Goel & Nelson, 2011; Hammond & Tosun,
2011; Tosun & Yilmaz, 2008), and revenue/expenditures of a lower level of
local government expressed as a share of revenue/expenditures of the next
higher level of local government (Akai & Sakata, 2002; Abdur et al., 2017;
Wallis & Oates, 1988). These studies also utilize indicators of fiscal
independence or some similar variables (Zhang & Zou, 1998; Akai & Sakata,
2002; Faguet & Sanchez, 2008; Yushkov, 2015; Desai, Freinkman, & Goldberg,
2005; Jin, Qian, & Weingast, 2005). Appendix Table A1 shows a summary of
these country-specific empirical literature on economic outcomes.

3. Methodology
3.1 Econometric Model
The following equation was estimated to determine the relationship
between decentralization and provincial poverty incidence:

=

+

1

∗

ℎ

+ ℎ∗

++µ

(1)

ℎ
where
is poverty incidence in province i,
is locally
where
sourced revenues expressed as percent share of total revenues of the provincial
government, Xi is
is aa vector
vector of
of control variables, and µ is the error term. The
parameter of
of interest is β1, which
The parameter
which measures
measuresthe
theresponse
responseofofpoverty
povertyincidence
incidence to the
to the decentralization indicator.
The variables in the control vector Xi are important because they allow
the relationship between poverty incidence and the decentralization indicator
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to be isolated. They were selected to control for most factors that can affect
poverty incidence and at the same time avoid too much multicollinearity among
the regressors. Balisacan and Fuwa’s (2004) paper on the determinants
of provincial poverty reduction in the Philippines served as a rough guide in
selecting the controls. The control variables included in equation (1) are: mean
years of schooling in the province (schooling); per capita expenditures of the
provincial government on education, health, nutrition, and population
control, labor and employment, and social services and social welfare
(socialservices); percent share of local government positions in the province
held by the largest political dynasty (dynasty); good governance index score
of the province (governance); dummy variables for provinces that are
adjacent to Metro Manila (manilaborder); per capita amount of bank deposits
in the province (bankdeposit); percent share of paved national roads in the
province (pavedroads); and index crime per capita in the province (crime).
Years of schooling is a natural determinant of poverty. Per capita
expenditure of the provincial government on education, health, nutrition, and
population control, labor and employment, and social services and social
welfare measures the local government’s spending on programs that can
potentially affect poverty. The good governance index is a measure of
governance and institutional quality, which some studies conclud affect
poverty (Chakravarti, 2005; Tebaldi & Mohan, 2010). The dynasties variable
was included as a measure of political inequality, and some studies found that
it could be associated with adverse development outcomes (Balisacan & Fuwa,
2004; Mendoza, Beja, Venida, & Yap, 2016). The bank deposit variable
measures wealth, while the share of paved roads measures infrastructure, which
can also affect poverty (Lokshin & Yemtsov, 2005; Latif, 2002). A dummy
variable for provinces adjacent to Metro Manila is included because the region
is the most developed in the country, has lower incidences of poverty, and
many residents from the adjacent provinces work in Metro Manila.
Several non-linear interaction terms are also added to the set of control
variables. A squared decentralization term is included to test if the relationship
between decentralization and poverty, if any, is linear or quadratic. The
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estimation also includes an interaction between decentralization and
governance and an interaction between decentralization and a dummy variable
for provinces below the median income (poorprov). These interaction terms
test whether any decentralization-poverty relationship varies across governance
quality and income levels.
3.2 Data and Estimation Method
Most of the data come from the Philippine Statistical Authority (PSA),
including poverty incidence and most control variables. The variable of
interest, locally sourced revenues expressed as a share of total revenues, is
computed using data from the Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF).
The provincial government expenditures on education, health, nutrition, and
population control, labor and employment, and social services and social
welfare, is likewise obtained from BLGF, while the share of local government
positions in the province held by the largest political dynasty is from the Asian
Institute of Management political dynasties database (Mendoza, Beja, Venida,
& Yap, 2012). Mean years of schooling come from the Philippine Human
Development Report.
The data on provincial poverty incidence is available only every three
years, and are available only for the years 2006, 2009, and 2012.1 On the
other hand, the variable of interest – percent share of locally sourced revenue
to total revenue – is available annually. To account for the timing difference
in available data, the 2012 poverty incidence data is matched with the annual
average localshare values of the previous three years (average for 2010, 2011,
and 2012). The same is done for the other control variables with annual
available data. The political dynasties variable is available for the election
years 2004, 2007, and 2010; thus, the 2012 poverty data is matched with the
2010 election data. This should be acceptable because a new set of elected
1

The poverty data is also available for 2015; however, very few control variables are
available for that year.
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local officials would likely require more than a year to influence the level of
development and governance in their provinces. The Good Governance
Indicator (GGI) is available only for 2005 and 2008; thus, the latter year index
is used.
The available data makes it possible to construct a three-period panel
of provinces. However, panel data estimation methods such as system GMM
and fixed effects are not used because regression results, tests, and statistics
showed that these are not appropriate. Equation (1) is estimated using crosssection data using the latest available year (2012 for poverty incidence; 2010
to 2012 annual average for most independent variables). To control for
possible endogeneity, it is estimated using a two-stage least squares regression
with localshare being instrumented by its first two lags. As will be discussed
later, statistical tests confirm that the decentralization variable, localshare, is
indeed endogenous, and that the chosen instruments met both the exogeneity
and the relevance criteria of a good instrument.
Intuitively, there are concerns that localshare is endogenous because
of bi-directional causality with the dependent variable. While the share of
locally sourced revenue can affect poverty incidence, it is also possible that
poverty incidence affects the share of locally sourced revenues. In provinces
with high levels of poverty, there are also low levels of economic activity,
which limits the provincial government’s ability to raise funds through local
sources such as local business taxes, service fees, and business permits. High
poverty incidence also implies lower private demand, translating to fewer
businesses, lower business profit, lower property values, and lower local taxes and fees, such as business taxes, real property taxes, and business permit
fees.
Table 1 contains the list of all variables used in the estimation, their
description, and the summary statistics.
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Table 1. Summary statistics and description of variables
Variable
Name

Variable description

Obs Mean

SD

Min

Max

poverty

Poverty incidence in the province 80
(2012)

35.964

14.966

5.428

74.416

localshare

Locally-sourced revenues of the
provincial government as percent
share of total revenues (annual
average from 2010 to 2012)

81

16.030

11.744

0.264

76.851

lag_
localshare

First lag of locshare (annual
average from 2007 to 2009)

81

13.626

11.483

0.146

76.967

lag2_
localshare

Second lag of locshare (annual
average from 2004 to 2006)

80

12.897

12.201

0.024

77.796

schooling

Mean years of schooling in the
province (2012)

80

8.691

1.030

6.279

11.022

socialservices Provincial government spending 78 307.978 284.554 24.278 1,708.095
on education, health, nutrition,
and
population control, labor and
employment, and social services
and social welfare, per capita PhP
(annual average from 2010 to
2012)
dynasty

Percent share of local positions in 80
the province held by the largest
dynasty in the province (2010
election)

governance

Good governance index (2008)

2.663

1.816

0.880

13.253

79 123.811 23.457 79.060

182.920

manilaborder Dummy =1 if province is
adjacent to Metro Manila; =0
otherwise

82

0.061

0.241

0

1

bankdeposit

78

19.602

34.823

0.000

305.962

Bank deposits in the province,
in thousands PhP per capita
(annual average from 2010 to
2012)
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pavedroads

Percent share of paved national
roads to total national roads in
the province

74

79.311

18.188 22.460

100.0

crime

Number of index crimes per
1,000 people (annual average
from 2010 to 2012)

78

1.584

0.989

0.079

6.770

poorprov

Dummy =1 if per capita income
in province is below median

80

0.500

0.503

0

1

localshare_
exp

Locally-sourced revenues of the 81
provincial government as percent
share of total expenditures
(annual average from 2010 to
2012)

22.304

18.086

0.301

114.959

lag_
localshare_
exp

First lag of localshare_exp
(annual average from 2007 to
2009)

81

16.576

14.525

0.164

97.477

lag2_
localshare_
exp

Second lag of localshare_exp
(annual average from 2007 to
2009)

80

14.592

14.257

0.025

95.196

Source: Author’s calculations.

4. Results and Discussions
4.1 Test of Endogeneity, Exogeneity, and Relevance
Three conditions must be ensured when using two-stage least squares
– exogeneity and relevance of the instruments. The suspected endogenous
variable is indeed endogenous. When all regressors are exogenous, 2SLS is
less efficient than OLS and standard errors of 2SLS tend to be large. Thus, if
there is no endogeneity, OLS should be used rather than 2SLS. Exogeneity
and relevance of the instruments ensure robustness and efficiency of estimates.
Further, when instruments are weak, hypothesis tests may not be valid (Stock,
Wright, & Yogo, 2002).
Testing for relevance is straightforward using the first stage of the
2SLS regression. Two instruments are relevant if they are jointly significant
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in the first stage. An additional rule of thumb is the F-statistic of the joint
significant test should be at least 10. The exogeneity condition is more difficult
to meet and is usually not testable if the number of instruments is the same as
the number of endogenous regressors. In these cases, one has to present a
strong theoretical argument for instrument exogeneity. If the number of
instruments is greater than the number of endogenous regressors, as is the case
in this study, exogeneity can be tested using the test for overidentifying
restrictions as outlined by Woodridge (2008). The first step is estimating the
equation through 2SLS and then obtaining the residuals. The next step is
regressing the residuals on all exogenous variables including the
instruments. The obtained R-square from this regression is multiplied it
by the number of observations. If the product is greater than the critical value
of the chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of
instruments minus the number of endogenous variables, then at least one of
the instruments is not exogenous.
Testing for endogeneity of localshare was performed using the test
proposed by Hausman (1978) and summarized by Wooldridge (2008).
The first step is estimating the reduced form equation for the suspect
endogenous variable and then generating the residuals. The next step is running
the structural equation and adding the residuals generated earlier as a regressor.
If the coefficient of the residual is statistically significant, then the suspect
variable is indeed endogenous. These tests showed that the two instruments
are jointly relevant and are exogenous, while localshare is indeed endogenous
as suspected.
4.2 Econometric Results
The regression results are reported in Table 2, including the results of
the tests for instrument exogeneity and relevance and the test for endogeneity
of localshare. Four regression results were shown in the table corresponding
to four columns. The first column of Table 2 shows the results with a complete
set of control variables, but without the interaction terms. The second column
includes the squared localshare term, the third includes the interaction between
the decentralization variable and governance, and the fourth includes
the interaction between decentralization and a dummy variable for provinces
with per capita income below the median.
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The decentralization indicator, localshare, consistently turns negative
and significant across all regressions in Table 2, with marginal effects ranging
from 0.38 to 0.60. A one percentage point higher locally sourced revenues
expressed as a share of total provincial government revenues is associated with
0.38 to 0.60 percentage point lower poverty incidence. Further results suggest
that this relationship is not linear and that it varies across quality of governance
and across income levels. Although none of the interaction terms turned
significant individually, each one of them was jointly significant with
localshare. That is, localshare and its squared term are jointly significant in
column 2, localshare and its interaction term with governance are jointly
significant in column 3, and localshare and its interaction term with the lower
income province dummy are jointly significant in column 4.
The positive coefficient of the squared localshare implies that as
localshare increases, the magnitude of its marginal effect on poverty
decreases. The negative coefficient of the interaction between localshare and
governance means that a greater governance score increases the magnitude of
the marginal effect of localshare on poverty, while the positive coefficient of
the interaction between localshare and the low-income province dummy
indicates that the magnitude of the marginal effect of localshare on poverty is
smaller among poorer provinces.
Turning the discussion to control variables, most significant variables
had their expected signs. Years of schooling, quality of governance, and amount
of bank deposits are almost consistently significant across all regressions. More
years of schooling, better governance score, and larger bank deposits are
associated with lower poverty incidence. On the other hand, crime and local
government spending on social services are positively associated with
poverty, although their significance is not consistent across the different
regressions.
As reported in Table 2, the instruments pass the test of relevance and
of overidentifying restrictions in all regressions. Moreover, the endogeneity
of locally sourced revenues expressed as percent share of total local government
revenues has been confirmed in all specifications. This strengthens the use of
2SLS in estimating the relationship between localshare and poverty. The
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r-squared ranges from 0.73 to 0.82, suggesting that the model can explain
a large share of the variation in poverty.
Table 2. 2SLS regression results
(1)

(2)

(3)

(5)

Dependent Variable: poverty
localshare

-0.452***

-0.595**

-0.531***

-0.454**

(0.158)

(0.232)

(0.187)

(0.196)

localshare_sqr

0.0131
(0.0111)

localshare*governance

-0.0135
(0.00820)

localshare*poorprov

0.0481
(0.273)

schooling
socialservices
dynasty
governance
manilaborder
bankdeposit
pavedroads
crime

-5.073***

-5.021***

-5.549***

-3.950***

(1.261)

(1.354)

(1.168)

(1.268)

0.00881*

0.00719

0.00362

0.00655

(0.00496)

(0.00536)

(0.00668)

(0.00462)

-0.754

-0.973

-0.293

-0.0661

(0.917)

(1.030)

(1.036)

(0.893)

-0.125**

-0.117*

-0.122**

-0.107*

(0.0577)

(0.0621)

(0.0586)

(0.0563)

-2.817

-4.427

4.195

-3.033

(4.576)

(4.644)

(7.377)

(4.413)

-0.385***

-0.379***

-0.343***

-0.189

(0.116)

(0.116)

(0.109)

(0.118)

-0.0672

-0.0679

-0.0381

-0.0815

(0.0649)

(0.0663)

(0.0628)

(0.0558)

2.525**

2.580**

2.777**

0.917

(1.255)

(1.261)

(1.233)

(1.222)
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8.496***
(2.275)

Constant

109.8***

110.5***

111.7***

93.35***

(10.35)

(11.33)

(9.658)

(10.26)

Observations

73

73

73

73

R-squared

0.734

0.726

0.742

0.786

Instrument Joint Significance
Test F-Stat in 1st Stage

32.9

22.07

26.94

17.58

Instruments relevance?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Instruments exogenous?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

localshare endogenous?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
localshare and localshare_sqr are jointly significant
localshare and localshare*governance are jointly significant
localshare and localshare*incomepc are jointly significant
localshare and localshare*poorprov are jointly significant
Source: Author’s calculations.

4.3 Robustness Check
Three additional regressions are run to serve as robustness checks to
the result that decentralization, as represented by fiscal independence, is
negatively associated with poverty. First, localshare is replaced by its first
lag (lag_localshare). This is to account for the possibility that decentralization
has a lag in its effect on poverty. Moreover, it is an alternative solution to the
endogeneity problem of localshare. The endogeneity of localshare comes from
reverse causality with poverty – localshare can affect poverty and poverty can
affect localshare. Using the lag of localshare can address this because past
values of localshare can affect future values of poverty, but future values of
poverty are unlikely to influence past values of localshare.
The second robustness check uses locally sourced revenues expressed
as a percent share of total expenditures (localshare_exp) as an alternative
measure of fiscal independence. Similar to localshare, a two-stage least squares
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regression is run with localshare_exp being instrumented by its first two lags.
Finally, lag of localshare_exp is used as the decentralization indicator.
The results are reported in Table 3. As shown, the coefficients on all the three
alternative measures of fiscal independence are negative and significant.
Table 3. Robustness checks
(1)

(2)

(3)

OLS

2SLS

OLS

Dependent variable: poverty
lag_localshare

-0.356***
(0.113)

localshare_exp

-0.283**
(0.110)

lag_localshare_exp

-0.278***
(0.0922)

schooling
socialservices
dynasty
governance
manilaborder
bankdeposit
pavedroads

-5.542***

-4.933***

-5.513***

(1.252)

(1.353)

(1.233)

0.0113**

0.00907*

0.0108**

(0.00427)

(0.00509)

(0.00441)

-0.985

-0.788

-1.080

(0.900)

(0.952)

(0.918)

-0.123**

-0.132**

-0.113**

(0.0539)

(0.0628)

(0.0550)

-3.754

-3.303

-4.202

(3.951)

(5.317)

(4.323)

-0.386***

-0.387***

-0.385***

(0.117)

(0.123)

(0.114)

-0.0690

-0.0737

-0.0685

(0.0636)

(0.0674)

(0.0637)
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crime

2.576**

2.563*

2.580**

(1.199)

(1.347)

(1.194)

111.1***

109.1***

109.8***

(10.10)

(10.77)

(10.03)

Observations

73

73

73

R-squared

0.761

0.710

0.758

Constant

95

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s calculations.

4.4 Discussions and Implications
The results suggest some interesting implications on the relationship
between decentralization – as measured by local government independence
– and poverty. Primarily, regression results suggest that fiscal independence
of the local government is associated with lower poverty incidence. That is,
poverty incidence is lower in localities where the local government does not
need to rely too much on the national government for revenues. This
relationship remains significant even after controlling for other factors that
may affect poverty such as governance and schooling level.
However, this relationship is non-linear. The signs and joint
significance of localshare and its squared term suggest that at low levels of
decentralization, it is negatively associated with poverty incidence. As
decentralization increases, the magnitude of the marginal effect diminishes
until it reaches a certain optimal point. At decentralization levels higher than
this optimal point, it becomes associated with higher poverty. The existence
of an optimal decentralization level is predicted in some theoretical models,
such as those of Davoodi and Zou (1998) and Xie et al. (1999). This result
provides some empirical support to these theoretical findings.
A possible explanation for this U-shaped relationship is that antipoverty programs implemented by local governments can be effective, but
only up to a certain point. Some large-scale public programs that have been
shown to alleviate poverty, such as improving infrastructure (Marinho,
Campelo, Franca, & Araujo, 2017; Seetanah, Ramessur, & Rojid, 2009) and
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improving education and health services (Anand & Ravallion, 1993;
Psacharopoulos, 1988; Squire, 1993), can be more efficiently and effectively
provided by the national government because these programs have larger
resource requirements. The central government’s economies of scale can also
drive down the per unit cost of large-scale public investments. When a country
becomes more decentralized, the central government becomes less involved
in the provision of critical public services, and local governments are tasked
to provide them. Therefore, at lower decentralization levels, wherein the local
governments are tasked to provide smaller scale public services, the benefits
of decentralization outweigh the disadvantages. The opposite occurs at
decentralization levels greater than the optimum.
Another important result is the positive effect of governance on the
decentralization-poverty relationship. Results suggest that the negative
association between decentralization – as represented by fiscal independence
of the local government – and poverty is stronger when governance is better.
It means that governance enhances the positive relationship between fiscal
independence and poverty alleviation. This coheres with existing conceptual
literature saying that governance has an important role in making
decentralization effective in achieving development outcomes (Jutting et al.,
2004; Jutting et al., 2005; Steiner, 2005; World Bank, 2007, 2009; Azfar et al.,
2001; Bardhan, 2002). Good governance is important in making
decentralization effective because it improves efficiency in resource utilization.
It also promotes accountability, which provides disincentives for corruption,
local elite capture, and other inefficiencies. In addition, good governance
prevents the wastage of scarce resources due to corruption and bureaucracy,
ensuring that they are used efficiently in implementing development programs
and providing public services, including those that promote poverty alleviation
(Steiner, 2005; Bardhan, 2002).
Another significant finding is that the relationship between
decentralization – as represented by local government fiscal independence –
and poverty is weaker among relatively poorer provinces. This implies that
any poverty alleviating effects of fiscal independence are felt most strongly in
areas that are relatively more well-off to begin with. This result can be explained
by higher-income provinces possessing the characteristics to take advantage
of the benefits of decentralization and fiscal independence. They have better
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infrastructure, institutions, and provide better services, all of which are
needed for decentralization to be effective. This result can have some policy
implications on the implementation of decentralization programs wherein the
objective is alleviating poverty. Considering that implementing a
decentralization program is costly, is it the most efficient program when it is
less effective among relatively worse-off areas?

5. Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations for Further
Study
This study found evidence that decentralization – as represented by
fiscal independence of the local government, and as measured by locally
sourced revenues of the provincial government expressed as a ratio of its total
revenues – is associated with lower poverty incidence. That is, poverty is
lower in provinces where the local government does not depend much on
transfers from the national government for funds. This highlights the importance
of developing a local government’s capacity to be more self-sufficient in
generating income to fund its expenditures.
The literature on decentralization has emphasized the importance of
the local government’s revenue generating ability in making decentralization
an effective development tool (Manasan, 1997; Capuno, 2017; Shen et al.,
2012; Bahl, 1999b). The findings in this paper coheres with and provides
empirical support to this argument. If the local government can generate its
own revenue, it is not too dependent on transfers from the national government.
A larger amount of funds is going to be readily available without the politics
associated with central government transfers, which Hutchcroft (2012) argues
is used as a tool for patronage politics with local government officials.
Moreover, in the Philippine case, although these transfers are designed to help
local governments with their spending functions, its allocation formula is not
tied to spending requirements (Capuno, 2017).
However, the negative association between fiscal independence and
poverty is not linear. The magnitude of the marginal effect decreases as fiscal
independence increases, suggesting that there is an optimal level of
decentralization. Moreover, the negative relationship between decentralization
and poverty is stronger among provinces with better governance and weaker
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among provinces that are relatively poor. This highlights the importance of
good governance in making decentralization effective, while the weaker
relationship among poorer provinces raises important policy questions when
the objective of decentralization is poverty alleviation.
It should be noted that this study covers one, albeit an important and
seldom empirically studied, aspect of decentralization – the fiscal independence
of local governments. Studying the effect of other forms and aspects of
decentralization on poverty and other development outcomes is a
recommended topic for further studies. These include the transfer of spending
and revenue responsibilities from the central to the local government and
giving more decision-making power to the consumers.
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Table A1. Some country-specific empirical decentralization studies
Study

Decentralization Measure

Akai and Local govt spending expressed as
Sakata

ratio of local plus state govt

(2002)

expenditure

Outcome

Coverage

Result

Economic

United

Positive

growth

States

Local govt revenue expressed as

Positive

ratio of local plus state govt revenue
Own-sourced local govt revenue

None

expressed as ratio of total local govt
revenue
Mean of the first two indicators
Hammond Number of single-purpose govern-

Positive
Employment

and Tosun ments per square mile
(2011)

United

Mixed positive

States

and none

Income

None

growth
Number of general-purpose

Employment

Mixed

governments per person

negative and
none
Income

None

growth
Lin and Marginal retention rate of locally
Liu

Per capita

collected revenues

GDP growth

Stansel Number of general-purpose

China

Positive

Positive

(2000)
(2005)

Per capita

United

governments per 100,000 popula-

income

States

tion

growth

Number of public school systems
per 100,000 population

None
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Tosun and Number of municipalities per
Yilmaz person

GDP per

Turkey

Mixed

capita

negative and

GDP per

None

(2008)

none
capita growth
rate
Development

Negative

index
Number of municipalities per unit
area

GDP per

Mixed

capita

negative and
none

GDP per

None

capita growth
rate
Development

Positive

index
Zhang and Provincial budgetary spending to
Zou
(1998)

central budgetary spending ratio
Provincial extra-budgetary to

Provincial

China

Negative

income
growth rate

Negative

central extra-budgetary spending
ratio
Consolidated provincial spending to

None

consolidated central spending ratio
Abdur et Provincial expenditures to total
al (2017) state expenditures ratio

Gross primary
school
enrollment

Pakistan

Positive
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Goel and Number of local governments per
Nelson

Corruption

100,000 population
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United

Positive

States

(decentraliza-

(2011)

tion associated
with greater
corruption)
Number of general-purpose local

Positive

governments per 100,000 population
Number of special-purpose local

Mixed none

governments per 100,000 popula-

and negative

tion
Share of local government

Negative

expenditure to state government
spending
Desai et al Share of locally-generated revenues
(2005)

retained by the regional government

Economic

Russia

Positive

growth
Foreign direct

Positive

investments
Felten-

Share of local government

stein and expenditure to total government
Iwata

expenditure

(2005)

Share of local government revenue

GNP growth

China

Positive

Bolivia

Positive

Colombia

Positive

rate

to total government revenue
Share of total extrabudgetary
revenue to total government
budgetary revenue
Faguet
and

Before-after implementation of
decentralization program

Sanchez
(2008)

Public
Investment in
Education

Own-sourced revenue as a share of
total expenditure

Yearly
increase in
student
enrollment in
state schools
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Yushkov Self-generated municipal revenue
(2015)

as share of regional budget
Municipal expenditure as share of
total regional expenditure

Growth rate of

Russia

None

per capita
gross regional

Negative

product

Share of self-generated revenues of

None

all municipalities in consolidated
municipal revenues of the region
Jin et al. Marginal retention rate of locally
(2005)

collected revenues

Growth of

China

Positive

Employment
in Rural
Businesses
Growth of
Employment
in Non-State
Non-Agricultural Businesses

Source: Author’s compilation.

Positive

